Fourteen years have passed since the short Georgian-Russian war started on August 7 in 2008. As every discussion on who started the war generally is, the Georgian-Russian one too is about finding moral grounds for military actions which both sides took at the time.Morality in geopolitics, and the Georgian-Russian conflict is indeed caused by pure geopolitical calculations, is at most times a superfluous thing.

All these years the Russians have been trying to convince the world and the public inside the country that the Russian military moves actions and subsequent recognition of the independence of the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions were the only possible and correct actions to be taken.

The Georgians also have their dilemmas: some marginal political figures still believe that it was the Georgian government that was most to blame for the catastrophe of 2008.

Though close geographically, these diverging narratives and the constant need to prove one’s own truth says a lot about how far apart Georgia and Russia have grown in the past decade.

Fourteen years since the war and it is still unclear what Russia has gained from its military and diplomatic actions since 2008.

True, military build-up in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region limited Tbilisi's ability to become an EU/NATO member state.

Moreover, Russian intervention into Georgia in 2008 also showed the West how far Moscow can go if a strategic decision is made to draw Georgia into the alliances.

At the time (August-September 2008) those seemed to be long-term (strategic) victories for Moscow.

In international relations and geopolitical calculations, you can stop a country from attaining the aims harmful to you, but in the long run you will be unable to reverse the process by forceful actions alone: you have to provide a counter-policy to turn an unfriendly state into an amenable neighbor.

Put all of this into the Russian case. More than a decade has passed since 2008, only a few not-so-important states recognized Georgia's territories as independent entities.

The Georgian public is overwhelmingly anti-Russian, the last hopes of a grand geopolitical bargain - the return of the territories in exchange for reversing EU/NATO aspirations - have disappeared among the Georgian public, and support for western institutions so far has only increased.

In the end, though Moscow waged a reasonably costly war in 2008, took and still experiences a diplomatic burden for its moves against the West, and has yet to attain its grand geopolitical goal of reversing Georgia's pro-western course.

Politicians in Moscow, at least strategists behind the scenes, all understand that Georgia's persistence, which seems naive today, might turn into serious business if Russia's geopolitical positions worsen elsewhere in Eurasia.

Indeed, there are signs that Russian influence is set to diminish further in the former Soviet space as the country's economy is unlikely to be attractive to the neighboring states.

Imagine a scenario where Russian internal problems (upcoming economic downturns) weigh ever stronger upon the Russian decision-makers in the 2020s, then Georgia's western aspirations might become more concrete - it will be easier for the West to make a strategic decision to draw Tbilisi into EU/NATO.

Overall, Russia definitely gained visible advantages in 2008, but in the long run it did not change the strategic picture in the South Caucasus.

Moscow did produce a grand design for geopolitical domination in north Eurasia: years after the war, Moscow initiated its Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) to draw its neighbors into one economic space - a prerequisite for building a world power.

Ideally, it should have attracted Russia’s major neighbors and it would have served the people of the former Soviet space economically.

But Moscow failed to get Ukraine and other states involved: without Kyiv, the EEU, if not dead, is at least a marginal project.

This means that Russian policies towards Georgia and the wider South Caucasus remain the same as before 2008 - keeping foreign powers out of the region, while failing to provide an alternative vision for Tbilisi.

By Emil Avdaliani,

Professor at European University,

Director of Middle East Studies at Geocase.

Holder of a master's degree from the University of Oxford and PhD degree from Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (TSU)