Recent developments surrounding the US-Iran negotiations are shaping a new political reality in the Middle East, where the Lebanese front and Israel’s position remain the principal flashpoints. In an interview with Front News, Middle East expert Bako Kheladze discusses the Swiss talks, the growing influence of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Donald Trump’s foreign policy maneuvering.

Q: Following the meeting in Switzerland, J.D. Vance stated that the United States had “laid the groundwork,” while Donald Trump’s military threats remain in force. Do you see a realistic opportunity to develop a stable roadmap within the proposed 60-day timeframe?

A: Yes, that is precisely the purpose of these meetings-to establish what you referred to as a roadmap and to ensure that the agreed conditions are not violated. This is a normal process when such a high level of distrust exists between the parties. Building confidence is essential.

From a confidence-building perspective, I would say positive and constructive steps have already been taken. The issue of a “hotline” has been resolved, meaning that Iran and the United States now have a direct communication channel should an incident occur. For example, they could contact each other regarding developments around the Strait of Hormuz or other matters requiring immediate coordination.

However, there remain numerous obstacles preventing the achievement of a final agreement. Many of these are technical issues that the parties will continue to discuss in the coming days.

The primary issue, however, is Lebanon. We know that Hezbollah operates under Iranian influence, and more broadly, Lebanon serves as a key component of Iran’s proxy infrastructure throughout the region. Hezbollah was, in fact, Iran’s first major proxy organization. Consequently, Iran considers it strategically important to preserve its position there.

Lebanon effectively functions as a constant sword of Damocles hanging over Israel. Iran uses these forces as a means of exerting pressure and influence on Israel.

Q: After Trump’s tweet, the Iranian delegation demonstratively walked out of the negotiations. Some analysts argue this was not an emotional reaction but rather a sign of Tehran’s growing confidence, strengthened by support from the Global South, China, and Russia. Do you agree that the era of unilateral pressure on Iran has ended and that Washington is now more interested in reaching an agreement than Tehran?

A: I would not necessarily characterize it as a sign of growing confidence. Such incidents are fairly common during negotiations of this nature.

If we are talking about confidence on Iran’s part, I would point more to the fourteen-point framework that forms the basis of the current negotiations. We all remember how that framework initially looked. At the outset, Trump’s position toward Iran was essentially: “Disarm yourselves.” Today, however, the situation is entirely different.

The contents of the current memorandum bear little resemblance to a scenario in which the United States is dictating terms to anyone.

Negotiations naturally involve political signaling. Trump’s statements, threats, and rhetoric are all part of the negotiation process. This is his style and political vocabulary, and by now it no longer carries the same weight it once did.

The same dynamic exists on the Iranian side. For example its supreme leader periodically releases statements or letters expressing dissatisfaction with the negotiations, implying that the negotiators may be conceding too much. These actions are also part of the diplomatic process.

Ultimately, this is information warfare and messaging from both sides. I would describe it as efforts to shape the information environment rather than anything more significant.

Q: Earlier, you mentioned the reportedly deceased son of Ayatollah Khamenei. This raises the broader question: Who is currently governing Iran? Is a new Ayatollah involved in the decision-making process, and can we say that the Revolutionary Guard has effectively assumed control of the country?

A: Yes, at present, Iran’s political agenda is largely being shaped by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and they are directing the overall course of events.

Based on the information available, Mojtaba Khamenei is believed to be alive and remains involved in governing the country, although reports suggest that he has been injured and has therefore remained absent from public view.

What we can say with certainty is that key decisions are currently being made by military figures or former military officials. Therefore, it is entirely fair to state that the military establishment represents one of the most powerful and influential factions within Iran today.

Q: As you noted, Lebanon remains the principal “minefield” in these negotiations. Iran insists that it will not sign a final agreement unless the war in Lebanon is completely halted, while Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has emphasized that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will not withdraw from the Lebanese security zone. Given these sharply opposing positions, how can US-Israeli cooperation continue, and could Israel ultimately oppose Washington’s policy?

A: It makes little difference who serves as Israel’s Prime Minister-whether it is Benjamin Netanyahu or someone else. Lebanon will remain a critical issue for Israel because it is fundamentally a security matter.

The presence of Hezbollah in Lebanon represents a direct challenge to Israeli security. Therefore, even if the agreement is important to the United States and to President Trump personally, Israel cannot simply accept it without reservations.

If Hezbollah and broader Iranian influence remain intact in Lebanon, it would mean that Israel will continue living under Iranian pressure for many years to come.

The disagreement between Israel and the United States already exists. About a week ago, when Trump announced that an agreement was within reach, the Lebanese issue was already visible in the background. Despite this, Israel was not backing down and continued its operations.

This was complicating the negotiations, which reportedly led to a very difficult conversation between Trump and the Israeli Prime Minister. Netanyahu appeared to pause temporarily, but what we are seeing now is that Israel is not significantly restricting its freedom of action and continues to move forward.

I believe that the tensions between the United States and Israel will become even more pronounced. Israel and Trump have fundamentally different objectives. The United States will continue attempting to exert pressure on Israel, while Israel and its leadership will seek to influence Trump and American policy from within the United States.

For that reason, it cannot be ruled out that the agreement may undergo further revisions.

Q: Trump argues that nuclear monitoring represents Washington’s principal achievement. Iran’s agreement to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors back into Tehran is being presented as one of the major successes of this negotiation round. In your view, what does this step signify from Iran’s perspective? Is it truly a major American success?

A: This was already achieved in 2015 under the administration of President Barack Obama. If it was considered so important, it should have been preserved.

However, Trump described that agreement as flawed and withdrew from it in 2018. What we are witnessing now is, in many respects, a revival or reworking of the same arrangement.

Therefore, I would not say that Trump has achieved anything particularly extraordinary in this regard. Similar accomplishments were secured by previous administrations as well.

Many of these mechanisms and monitoring provisions had already been clearly established in earlier agreements. As a result, I do not consider this to be a major or unprecedented achievement by Trump.

By Elza Paposhvili

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