October 4 protest as attempt to trigger revolution built on very weak foundation, Archil Gamzardia

The events of 4 October - a day marked by a large opposition-organised protest in Tbilisi - became a critical moment for Georgia’s political landscape. The ruling Georgian Dream party claimed the demonstrations were part of an attempted coup and a revolutionary scenario aimed at toppling the government by force. Opposition figures, meanwhile, are still analysing why their plans failed and why the real purpose of the rally remained unclear to the public.

In an interview with Front News, Dr. Archil Gamzardia, a political philosopher, discusses the weaknesses of the opposition’s revolutionary strategy, the possible involvement of Georgia’s State Security Service (GSSS), and the enduring strength of the ruling party’s power structure.

“Revolution without leadership is impossible”

Q: After 4 October, even opposition figures have struggled to explain what happened - why people were mobilised, and what the organisers’ real goal was. The authorities claim it was a revolutionary plot to overthrow the government by force. How do you assess the situation?

A: The 4 October events represented a potential for crisis, but even at the theoretical level the approach was flawed. If you aim to change a government, you must have at least a coherent theoretical plan - not to mention a practical one. I have said before that there are only two active ways to achieve that: revolution or uprising.

Revolutions require leadership - it is impossible to have one without leaders capable of operating even within the system they seek to replace. That wasn’t the case here. As for an uprising, despite widespread public dissatisfaction, there is no deep-seated antagonism toward the authorities that would drive masses into the streets. Anger is not the same as hatred.

“They tried a revolutionary scenario - but it rested on nothing”

Q: Which of these scenarios - revolution or uprising - did the organisers attempt?

A: From what I observed, it was an attempt to develop events according to a revolutionary script. But the entire process was built on an extremely weak foundation. It seemed that hopes were placed on one or two individuals - perhaps insiders within the system - who were expected to provide a key opening from within.

This reliance on a single uncertain factor, without alternatives, created the illusion that if protesters seized the Presidential Palace, the situation would turn in their favour. They may have expected to declare President Salome Zourabichvili as the country’s legitimate leader, thus avoiding a constitutional vacuum. That, in their view, could have paved the way for occupying other government buildings - a classic revolutionary path. But once their initial plan collapsed, everything else fell apart instantly.

“The opposition may have fallen into a trap”

Q: Could this have been a trap? Could the information the organisers relied on have been part of a well-planned state security operation?

A: When a political culture is underdeveloped, childish approaches emerge - people believe what they want to believe. It’s possible that what seemed like reliable information was, in fact, a carefully designed illusion.

Georgia’s State Security Service clearly played a role. There’s a concept called situational modification - when you feed your opponent just enough information to make them think they’re executing their own plan, while in reality, they’re acting within yours. I believe that’s what happened - the opposition’s expectations and illusions were deliberately shaped.

“Zourabichvili probably wasn’t aware of the plan”

Q: The authorities claim that President Salome Zourabichvili was involved in the events. What’s your assessment?

A: I doubt she was directly aware of the plan. She was likely nearby, observing the situation, perhaps thinking she might be called upon at some point. Knowing her political style, I don’t believe she was in on the details from the start.

It’s possible that the organisers saw her as a potential transitional figure - much like Nino Burjanadze during the 2003 Rose Revolution. The “betrayal” being discussed could refer either to a breakdown of trust within the organisers’ circle or to a failed expectation that someone within the ruling camp would switch sides.

The GSSS often operates by cultivating trust with certain individuals or groups, feeding them selective information, and guiding them toward a controlled outcome - exactly what may have occurred here.

“Hints about former officials joining the opposition were part of the simulation”

Q: The media and government figures had hinted that some former senior officials - such as Garibashvili, Gomelauri, or Liluashvili - were cooperating with the opposition. Was that also part of the game?

A: I believe so. You can’t stage a revolution without some control over part of the system, so creating an illusion of insider defection fits the logic perfectly.

These figures - all former security or defence officials - know the system too well to genuinely risk it without guarantees. So if they appeared to communicate with the opposition, it may have been under the direction of the security services, or it was pure simulation from the start.

“The opposition is now trapped in mutual blame”

Q: The opposition is now divided, with key figures arrested and others publicly accusing one another. What happens next?

A: That’s a normal psychological phase. When something fails, the first instinct is not to analyse the cause but to find someone to blame. Each leader is trying to protect their image within their own support base. Once that phase passes, they will either move to a new stage or disintegrate further.

“The ruling party’s power remains strong - its real challenge is external”

Q: What has the ruling party gained from the failed “revolution”?

A: The government was already in a winning position. Claims that the Georgian Dream was collapsing or infighting were pure illusion. In reality, its power remains stable and resilient. The only real challenge lies in foreign relations. The Georgian Dream wants to join the European Union while maintaining an authoritarian model - that’s its central dilemma.

Domestically, the protests damaged its image but not its control. The large rallies temporarily weakened the government’s prestige, but institutionally it remains solid.

“Ivanishvili wants the West to accept him as he is”

Q: Georgian Dream recently said it will not expel ambassadors or issue protest notes, and that it remains in a “unilateral friendship” with the EU. What does this signal?

A: Bidzina Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream are always in a process of “reconciliation” with the West - but on their own terms. Ivanishvili’s message is simple: “Accept me as I am.”

He’s trying to convince Western partners that there’s no alternative to him - that no one else in Georgia can ensure stability or be a reliable counterpart. By portraying the opposition as hopeless and fragmented, he hopes to make the West fear Georgia’s “loss” and thus accept his rule, even in its current authoritarian form.

Interview by Elza Paposhvili