Int’l analyst Khatiashvili: Trump is trying to show Iran fuel prices will not weaken him

The situation in the Middle East has intensified following the Trump administration's renewed air strikes against Iran and Tehran's retaliatory attacks on US military bases in the region. Questions remain over the effectiveness of Washington's air campaign without a ground operation, Iran's leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and the potential impact of oil prices on US domestic politics. Foreign policy analyst Giorgi Khatiashvili discussed the latest developments in the Middle East in an interview with Front News.

Q. Why has the Trump administration decided to intensify its strikes against Iran at a time when the region is already highly volatile? From a global geopolitical perspective, what specific interests does Washington's move serve? Is it solely about safeguarding freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, or is the United States also seeking to demonstrate its position as the dominant power in the Middle East amid the growing influence of China and Russia?

A. First of all, the ceasefire agreement failed. Trump faced considerable criticism because of that agreement, so there is pressure on him to prove that he was right. His position is that he will neither make concessions nor back down. This is also a signal he is trying to send.

The obvious question, however, is what these new air strikes will achieve that three months of bombing did not, especially if there is no deployment of ground forces.

The second objective is an old one – to achieve what was not accomplished over the previous three months: forcing Iran to accept certain conditions. Iran's position, meanwhile, is essentially: "You cannot overthrow us and after the bombing we will still be standing." By doing so, Tehran is trying to demonstrate that it would be better for Washington to reach an agreement because bombing alone will not change anything.

Iran's strategy is to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage. It wants to use the strait as its way out of this conflict. Tehran would rather absorb the bombing while proving to the United States that either the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed or, regardless of how much bombing takes place, it will not reopen unless Iran decides otherwise.

Even if any blockade were lifted, what tanker operator would risk entering the Strait of Hormuz? Iran no longer needs nuclear submarines for this. A single drone strike against a tanker could be enough.

Iran's calculation is that it can force the United States to negotiate on Tehran's terms. It is rather like a boxing match: no matter how many punches you throw, I will not be knocked out and eventually I will force you to reach a settlement on my terms. That is essentially the contest we are witnessing.

Q. Iran's response this time was swift and direct, with strikes on US military bases in Kuwait and Bahrain. From a geopolitical perspective, does Iran have the resources to sustain a prolonged war of attrition against the United States?

A. Whether Iran has the resources is one question. But neither Iran nor the United States has unlimited resources. Iran is under significant economic strain and many of its missiles have already been destroyed, so its military capabilities are not inexhaustible. We also know Iran cannot strike Los Angeles, which is why it targets countries that host US military assets or cooperate with Washington.

Iran's message is essentially this: "You may kill a million of our people, but the rest will continue fighting. By contrast, if the United States loses 20 soldiers, it becomes headline news and sparks public outrage." If petrol prices rise by just one dollar, can the US sustain this war politically?

Washington's strategy is to wear Iran down physically and weaken it economically. Iran's strategy, however, is to exhaust the United States politically and psychologically, forcing Washington to seek a settlement. Tehran's argument is that the US lacks the political resilience to absorb even relatively limited casualties, as they would generate significant domestic pressure. That is why Iran wants oil prices to rise and increase the political cost of the conflict for the United States.

Q. Do you expect Iran to fully activate its so-called "Axis of Resistance" - its network of proxy groups across the region - and escalate towards widespread sabotage of regional infrastructure?

A. Hamas has continued to fight despite three years of bombardment. In Yemen, these people have been at war since 2015. Moreover, the Russia-Ukraine war has shown that it takes only a handful of drones to disable a major oil facility.

As for Iran's capabilities, its regional network has undoubtedly been significantly weakened. However, the key question is whether it still has the capacity to carry out limited acts of sabotage if it chooses to do so. In my view, it does. The real question is whether Tehran will decide to escalate further, and if so, to what extent.

Q. The escalation has already directly affected countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan, where Iranian missiles have been intercepted in their airspace. What long-term geopolitical and economic consequences could this confrontation have for the Middle East? Could Washington's unilateral military campaign prompt Gulf monarchies, such as Qatar or Saudi Arabia, to distance themselves from the United States in pursuit of their own security interests?

A. Iran's calculation is straightforward. As I said earlier, it cannot reach Los Angeles, so it strikes what it can reach - America's allies, its military bases and its interests. The aim is to pressure those countries into calling President Trump and urging him to reach a settlement. Another objective is to demonstrate that the United States cannot fully guarantee their security.

At the same time, these countries are unlikely to express their dissatisfaction publicly, because doing so would expose their own vulnerability. The United States remains their only credible security guarantor, so openly criticising Washington is not really an option. Just as they endured the previous three months of strikes, they are likely to endure this latest wave as well.

Q. How could another prolonged military campaign in the Middle East affect President Trump's political standing, both domestically and internationally? Could this conflict become the Trump administration's most significant foreign policy setback? We know that local elections in the United States are due to take place in November.

A. It is difficult to say how much the conflict with Iran will influence the elections. There is still time until November and voters generally do not have such long political memories. In the United States, people largely vote according to party affiliation. Much like football supporters, many Americans remain loyal to the same political party for years, often across generations.

The conflict itself is unlikely to have a direct impact on the elections, but higher petrol prices certainly could. That is precisely what Iran is trying to achieve — driving up oil prices to make fuel more expensive for American consumers. Public dissatisfaction over rising fuel costs could translate into votes against Trump.

That said, whether Trump wins or loses the election is a separate issue. As Commander-in-Chief, he ultimately directs military policy and the election itself is unlikely to alter the course of military operations in the short term. Trump appears determined to see this through and to demonstrate to Iran that it will not be able to weaken him by driving up petrol prices or force him into making concessions. At this stage, both sides are engaged in a contest of resolve, with neither willing to back down.