Bombing Iran is easy - but what happens next? - expert Khatiashvili

The assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has significantly altered the balance of power in the Middle East. While Israel describes this as a historic opportunity and Western capitals discuss the potential collapse of Iran’s theocratic regime, questions remain about the durability of the system and the risks of wider regional instability. Front News spoke with international analyst Giorgi Khatiashvili.

Q: Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says the leader’s death does not mean the system will collapse. In your view, how resilient is Iran’s Assembly of Experts, and could it quickly appoint a new leader - for example, Mojtaba Khamenei - to avoid internal confrontation? What scenario do you expect?

Khatiashvili: Let us begin with what appears to be the United States’ declared strategy toward Iran. First, demilitarization - destroying its ballistic and military capabilities. Second, decapitation of the regime - eliminating the leadership and weakening state structures to the point where the population might eventually overthrow the system.

The key question is whether Iran - and its so-called “deep state” - can withstand this pressure. Khamenei has been killed, but the system continues to function. Much depends on whether people take to the streets. I consider it highly unlikely that mass protests would erupt under conditions of active bombardment. In such circumstances, speaking about revolution is unrealistic.

Iran’s current objective appears to be endurance. It aims to survive the strikes and expand the conflict across the region, thereby draining American resources. Intercepting missiles requires missiles. At the same time, Tehran seeks to pressure neighboring states to such an extent that they ask Washington - and President Donald Trump - to reach a ceasefire. Through oil prices or other leverage, Iran wants to inflict enough economic pain to force negotiations.

Iranian leaders understand they cannot win a direct war against the United States and Israel. If they endure, that alone could be framed as victory. Each passing day increases the risk of strategic stalemate for Washington.

You can bomb and devastate a country - but what happens next? If revolution does not follow, and part of the population supports the regime, killing the leader may strengthen anti-American sentiment rather than weaken the system.

Q: Reports suggest that Mossad used cyber capabilities to track senior Iranian officials and breach surveillance systems. During previous escalations, Khamenei was reportedly moved to a bunker. Why, at such a high-risk moment, was he in his residence with his family? Was this deliberate martyrdom - or betrayal?

Khatiashvili: There are two main interpretations. First, Khamenei was 87 years old and may have concluded that death was inevitable. In Shiite theology, martyrdom carries deep symbolic significance. It is possible he chose to remain in place deliberately, seeking to unify the nation through sacrifice.

The second possibility is betrayal. When public warnings indicate imminent strikes, why remain in a residence instead of a secured bunker? Not even within fortified facilities? Moreover, he was reportedly with family members and senior generals. How was he even allowed to leave secure protection? Many questions remain unanswered.

Q: Many analysts argue that airstrikes alone cannot dismantle such an ideologically entrenched regime. A ground invasion of Iran is widely viewed as unrealistic given geography and population size. Some also suggest President Trump may be under pressure from Israel. How realistic is that assessment?

Khatiashvili: Regardless of external pressure, the strategic reality is clear: how long can a country sustain large-scale bombing? If Iran continues to resist, the cost becomes extremely high. The United States does not want to become trapped in another prolonged conflict. Yemen has been bombed for years - yet the strategic outcome remains limited.

The theoretical objective would be regime collapse and the emergence of leadership willing to halt uranium enrichment and normalize relations with Israel. But Iran’s institutional structure is different. It is not easily dismantled through air power alone.

Iran reportedly has up to two million armed personnel and has demonstrated resilience. Bombing is easy. The real question is what follows.

Q: Is there an organized opposition inside Iran capable of turning unrest into a popular revolution or seizing power?

Khatiashvili: There is dissatisfaction within Iran, but there is no clearly structured opposition capable of assuming control. Revolution and chaos do not necessarily bring liberal or pro-Western leadership; they may produce something even more radical.

Hundreds of thousands have attended mourning rallies. Iran is not composed solely of those celebrating the Ayatollah’s death. Destroying nuclear infrastructure and damaging the country does not automatically trigger regime change. That assumption is far from guaranteed.

Q: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has described this as a historic moment. What is Israel’s ultimate red line - eliminating the nuclear program, or dismantling Iran as a state?

Khatiashvili: Israel’s objective is clearly defined. Whether Iran becomes democratic is not the issue. The priority is eliminating Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and its nuclear program. From Israel’s perspective, Iran represents an existential threat. Neutralizing that threat is the strategic goal.

Q: Is the West prepared for the geopolitical shock that could follow a collapse of the Iranian regime? We have seen public disagreements between President Trump and European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron.

Khatiashvili: Power defines influence. Europe traditionally approaches Iran with caution because of its own vulnerabilities and geographic exposure. If Iranian missiles can reach Cyprus, that risk shapes decision-making. President Trump’s dissatisfaction likely reflects expectations of stronger alignment from allies such as the United Kingdom.

Q: Turning to the South Caucasus: Armenia and Azerbaijan both expressed condolences, with President Ilham Aliyev particularly explicit in his position. Georgia adopted a more neutral stance. Was that appropriate?

Khatiashvili: If Washington approaches the region pragmatically, it should not interpret the positions of Georgia, Azerbaijan, or Armenia negatively. Georgia does not have the luxury of pursuing activist foreign policy. It is not protected by NATO and remains partially occupied by Russia.

Nor does Georgia possess Israel’s military capabilities - advanced air power or missile defense systems. Iran is approximately 500 kilometers away. If its missiles can reach Cyprus, they can reach Georgia. Maintaining a cautious and balanced policy is therefore a matter of national security.

Q: Does the opposition in Georgia adequately assess these risks?

Khatiashvili: It is easy to make bold statements from opposition benches. Foreign policy must be grounded in power realities, security calculations, and regional constraints.

Any Georgian government, regardless of party affiliation, should prioritize stable relations with Iran. Supporting “regime change” activism from Tbilisi would not strengthen Georgia’s security - it would endanger it.

Criticizing the government is legitimate. But critics should also explain what concrete strategy they propose for navigating the profound instability unfolding in the region.