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Kremlin can’t come up with anything now that would make US or Ukraine step back, Int’l analyst Koberidze

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Still, Trump may press for steps that align with his plan. I expect that plan will be coordinated with Ukraine, and Trump will discuss it directly with Zelenskyy. But Russia, in my view, won’t accept any arrangement other than its own. It’s all a game - a bluff, Koberidze said

Still, Trump may press for steps that align with his plan. I expect that plan will be coordinated with Ukraine, and Trump will discuss it directly with Zelenskyy. But Russia, in my view, won’t accept any arrangement other than its own. It’s all a game - a bluff, Koberidze said

The world is now waiting to see whether US President Donald Trump will use his diplomatic capital gained in Gaza to apply pressure on Vladimir Putin - including by activating the potential transfer of Tomahawk-type cruise missiles to Ukraine.

The US president’s optimism about ending the Russia-Ukraine war, expressed after a two-hour call with Putin, has raised cautious expectations, though analysts doubt Putin’s readiness to make concessions while he still believes he is winning.

Meanwhile, behind closed doors, Kyiv and Washington are reportedly holding secret negotiations on a peace plan and the post-war security framework - a factor that further heightens tension for the Kremlin.

International affairs analyst Giorgi Koberidze discusses this complex geopolitical chess game with Front News - from Trump’s next steps to the Kremlin’s “red lines,” and the potential mediation roles of Erdoğan and Lukashenko.

Q. Experts believe that after Trump’s “Gaza triumph,” his next focus will be Ukraine. His achievement in the Israel-Hamas talks could encourage him to try stopping what he calls the “ninth war.” How realistically might Trump use this diplomatic capital to pressure Putin, and what concrete form could this take?

A. There’s already talk about transferring cruise missiles to Ukraine. If that happens, it will be one of the ways to pressure Russia. Trump will likely use it to signal that if Moscow doesn’t engage in real peace talks or take tangible steps, the US will go ahead with transferring Tomahawks to Ukraine.

I doubt it will have a decisive effect, but as an attempt, it’s a reasonable move because it certainly worries Putin - such weapons could indeed allow strikes deep inside Russian territory. Whether Trump will make this the main focus or not, it’s more of a testing phase. Trump is playing a tactical game, showing Russia: if you don’t move toward a ceasefire, I’ll help Ukraine this way.

Q: If Trump does deliver these missiles to Ukraine, what could be the Kremlin’s response? Are we looking at a “red line” being crossed?

A: Russia has already drawn many red lines - Crimea’s bridge, strikes on Russian territory, even near Kursk - and none of those triggered an extraordinary response. What else can they do now? The Kremlin has used every possible means against Ukraine except nuclear weapons.

That’s why I don’t expect anything new. Yes, they might again attack civilian cities; that’s their typical tactic - stockpile weapons and then unleash them. But, as I’ve said, the Kremlin can’t come up with anything now that would make the US or Ukraine step back.

Q: Analysts claim that on 17 October the topics were so sensitive that Trump and Zelenskyy didn’t even trust a secure phone line and met in person. What non-military, secret issues could they have discussed - perhaps the outlines of a peace plan or Putin’s post-war political future?

A: If the topic was a peace plan, of course it couldn’t be discussed over the phone. They might have talked about future deployments of US or NATO troops. One thing is what Trump’s plan is, another is how realistic it is. I don’t believe Russia will agree to any plan that includes a ceasefire on unfavourable terms. Zelenskyy will, in turn, try to persuade Trump to approve more weapons transfers.

Q: After his call with Putin, Trump described the conversation as “very fruitful” and “productive,” claiming “significant progress” had been made toward ending the war. How do you assess that optimism?

A: As long as Putin believes he’s winning, he has every reason to keep fighting. I don’t think Russia is ready to back down. If Putin truly wanted to end the war, he would have done so already - he wouldn’t have called for renewed mobilization, and we’d see signs of de-escalation. Even in Gaza, the ceasefire is temporary.

In the Russia-Ukraine case, even if the guns fall silent, fighting could restart at any moment. Putin feels he hasn’t yet achieved his final goal. He might negotiate if he gets what he wants, but under any other conditions, I don’t expect him to agree.

Q: Zelenskyy keeps emphasizing the need for weapons and readiness for new offensives. After the Gaza deal, could pressure grow on Ukraine to accept political compromises - for example, delaying NATO accession - as a condition for a ceasefire?

A: That’s the key question. If Russia keeps repeating the same narrative - we want peace but Ukraine doesn’t - Trump’s pressure will be inevitable. Six months ago, Trump’s proposals were rejected by Russia; then Putin demanded Ukraine’s demilitarization, which Kyiv will never accept.

Still, Trump may press for steps that align with his plan. I expect that plan will be coordinated with Ukraine, and Trump will discuss it directly with Zelenskyy. But Russia, in my view, won’t accept any arrangement other than its own. It’s all a game - a bluff.

Q: What roles could Erdoğan and Lukashenko play in achieving a ceasefire? Trump sees Erdoğan as a potential facilitator, while Lukashenko says he’s ready to join talks if the US recognizes his role.

A: Turkey’s influence is significant - Erdoğan does have leverage with Putin. They’ve cooperated before, including on Syria, when necessary. They’re regional rivals but understand the scale of US power and avoid open escalation.

Still, Erdoğan’s role in fully resolving the conflict will remain minimal for now - Putin simply lacks the political will to end the war. However, Erdoğan could mediate prisoner exchanges or host peace talks. His role as an intermediary is useful.

As for Lukashenko, Ukraine doesn’t trust him, so his role is questionable at best.

By Elza Paposhvili 


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