Russia striking civilian targets as it lacks military success in Ukraine, Int’l analyst Koberidze

Against the backdrop of mounting pressure on the battlefield and the gradual loss of military initiative, the Kremlin has intensified combined attacks on Ukrainian cities, particularly Kyiv.

International affairs analyst Giorgi Koberidze has claimed the strikes are increasingly aimed not at achieving strategic military breakthroughs, but at exerting psychological pressure on civilians and undermining Ukrainian morale.

In his interview with Front News, Koberidze discusses Russia’s deteriorating logistical situation, the significance of Ukraine’s growing operational initiative, the strategic logic behind attacks on civilian infrastructure, and the broader military and political implications of Moscow’s escalation.

Q. Russia has intensified combined attacks on Ukrainian cities, particularly Kyiv. How do you assess this escalation, and what military objective does the mass use of non-nuclear kinetic warheads serve?

A. Russia is genuinely struggling on the battlefield at the moment. The situation has evolved rather unexpectedly. Around this time last year, Ukraine maintained a much more rigid defensive posture, inflicting heavy losses on Russian forces. It took Russia more than a year to capture Pokrovsk.

However, despite Ukrainian drone operations and aerial strikes, the signs of Russia’s weakening position were not as visible or predictable then as they are today. It is now evident that Russian units mobilized in the Donetsk region have been significantly depleted and overstretched.

At the same time, Russia has failed to achieve decisive success in the Kharkiv region despite enormous pressure. Russian forces launched direct assaults on Kupiansk, yet still failed to capture the city. That failure further exposed the exhaustion of Russian forces.

We are now witnessing the initiative gradually shifting toward Ukraine - both on the ground and in the air. Especially after Russia lost access to Starlink systems, Ukrainian drone strikes intensified, including in the Mariupol direction, indicating serious complications in Russian logistics.

Russian positions in Starobilsk - one of Moscow’s major logistical hubs in the Luhansk region - were also struck.

Following the successful Ukrainian attacks, including strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, Moscow responded with attacks on the Ukrainian capital. When Russia cannot achieve progress on the front line or regain military initiative, attacks on Kyiv serve as a message: “If I cannot succeed militarily, I can still strike civilian infrastructure.”

Another critically important point is that Russia does not regard civilian infrastructure as illegitimate targets. For Moscow, virtually any civilian object can become a potential target.

There is nothing fundamentally new in this strategy. Russia began striking civilian buildings in Kyiv as early as 2022, only two months after the start of the full-scale invasion.

The objective is clear: to weaken the morale of Ukrainian society through fear and civilian casualties. This is deeply embedded in the operational logic of the Russian military machine.

Q. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, citing partner intelligence services, warned that the Kremlin may be preparing even larger-scale strikes. Media discussions increasingly focus on the possibility of attacks targeting Kyiv’s government district and the Presidential Office on Bankova Street. How realistic is such a scenario in the near future?

A. Until now, government buildings had largely remained outside the scope of direct targeting. There appeared to be an unspoken understanding between Russia and Ukraine that neither side would deliberately strike government facilities.

However, once one side violates such an unwritten rule, retaliation becomes inevitable.

A few days ago, one of Russia’s missiles struck near the Ukrainian parliament building, although it remains disputed whether this was intentional. Moscow claims it was accidental and not a deliberate strike.

If Russia deliberately crosses that line, then the Kremlin itself could become a legitimate target. Russia understands this very well, and that is one of the main reasons why Kyiv’s government district has largely avoided direct strikes so far.

That said, I cannot rule out the possibility that Moscow may eventually take such a step. If it does, it would indicate that Russia has exhausted nearly all other calculated military and political options and has descended to a far more dangerous level of escalation.

Russia has consistently tried to project the image that it remains capable of winning the war conventionally and maintaining control over the battlefield situation.

Q. Russian officials openly threaten to continue testing the Oreshnik missile system under combat conditions. Is this intended as a signal to the West that Moscow is prepared to use strategic weapons? Where is the line between psychological blackmail and a genuine nuclear threat?

A. The Oreshnik is undeniably a very powerful missile system. However, without a nuclear warhead, its practical military utility is somewhat limited.

Its primary advantage lies in the difficulty of intercepting it.

At this stage, Russia’s objective is not solely physical destruction. There is also a major psychological component involved. However, if these strikes become too frequent, even the psychological impact gradually diminishes. That is precisely why Russia does not use the system regularly.

Another important factor is that Moscow does not possess a large operational stockpile of these missiles. Although the system is based on Soviet-era prototypes, Russia has only recently begun deploying it operationally.

As a result, they cannot afford to use these missiles extensively.

If we compare the destructive capacity of the Iskander and the Oreshnik, the difference is not particularly dramatic. The Oreshnik’s main advantages are speed and survivability against interception.

Once that psychological effect weakens, the value of the missile as a strategic intimidation tool also decreases.

That is one of the reasons Russia may avoid using it too frequently.

And once again, attacks on civilian infrastructure occur because Russia is failing to achieve meaningful military success on the battlefield.

No country wastes expensive strategic missiles without reason.

Ukraine’s front line is enormous. If these systems are not producing meaningful military results there, Moscow redirects them toward civilian targets in an attempt to compensate psychologically.

The logic of Russian military doctrine is straightforward: if success on the battlefield cannot be achieved, then civilian infrastructure becomes a tool of intimidation.

Q. Ukraine is urgently requesting stronger anti-ballistic defense capabilities from Western partners. President Zelenskyy has urged allies to respond proactively rather than after escalation occurs. In your view, what concrete steps could the United States and the European Union realistically take in the immediate future?

A. Unfortunately, I do not expect the United States to dramatically increase pressure on Russia in the immediate future in order to alter the course of the war.

At present, American foreign policy is experiencing considerable internal turbulence, and containing Russia is not Washington’s top strategic priority.

As for Europe, European states currently lack the consolidated resources necessary for full-scale strategic deterrence.

What Europe can realistically do is accelerate the production and transfer of additional air defense systems to Ukraine.

Another essential step would be placing the closure of Ukrainian airspace on the international agenda.

That would represent the ideal maximum scenario.

Although I do not realistically expect such a move soon, it would undoubtedly be one of the most effective measures available.

Q. Does Russia currently possess the resources necessary to launch another major counteroffensive by summer? Do you see conditions developing for such an operation?

A. At the moment, Ukrainian forces hold the initiative in the Zaporizhzhia region.

Russia is currently regrouping and concentrating manpower. Moscow clearly intends to launch another offensive operation.

Potential scenarios could include attacks launched from Belarus toward western Ukraine, toward Kyiv, or even in the direction of Chernihiv.

The intention certainly exists, but Russia’s main problem at present is logistics.

Ukraine is attempting to prevent such offensives by systematically targeting Russian logistical infrastructure behind the front line.

The objective is precisely to prevent Russia from regaining the initiative and opening new fronts.

The only territory Ukraine largely avoids striking is Belarus itself, which is why Belarus remains strategically dangerous.

Of course, nothing can be ruled out.

If Ukraine fails to continue exhausting Russian logistics, Moscow will attempt to sustain mobilization efforts and regain the initiative during the summer campaign season.

Traditionally, Russia intensifies offensive operations in June and July.

These are historically the months during which Moscow attempts to restore momentum.

The coming months will determine whether Russia is still capable of doing so.

Ukraine, meanwhile, is focused specifically on disrupting that potential offensive before it can fully materialize.

By Elza Paposhvili