US seeks to control the Caucasus trade artery, expert Mamuka Areshidze

In an interview with Front News, conflict analyst Mamuka Areshidze discusses the growing geopolitical tensions in the South Caucasus, the potential role of the United States in the management of the Zangezur Corridor, the shifting regional balance, and the implications for Georgia's foreign policy orientation.

Q: Mr. Areshidze, reports suggest a memorandum has been approved by Armenia, Azerbaijan and the US on managing the Zangezur Corridor via an American company. How credible is this, especially considering President Ilham Aliyev’s recent remarks that the corridor will not be opened?

Areshidze: There has been persistent disagreement over who should oversee the Zangezur Corridor. To resolve this, the US proposed a neutral, private American company as a third-party manager - similar to the previously attempted agreement between Georgia, [the country’s Russian-occupied] Abkhazia, and Tskhinvali [South Ossetia], where a Swiss company was to monitor cargo. That didn’t succeed, but the model is being revisited.

Armenia’s suggestion - that cargo be controlled from Nakhchivan - lacks seriousness and appears to be a delay tactic. Still, I believe a deal may eventually emerge, largely due to strong pressure from Washington. The US proposal, while ostensibly technical, veils larger political concerns. For Azerbaijan, any solution must preserve its political leverage, and negotiations will likely proceed through Turkey and France as intermediaries for Baku and Yerevan, respectively. The fear among major players is that, should a compromise fail, Russia could reassert dominance in the region.

Q: How do you assess the recent surge in American activity in the South Caucasus? What are Washington’s strategic goals, and how do Iranian interests factor into this? Where does Georgia fit into this dynamic?

Areshidze: The South Caucasus is becoming a critical transit route between East and West. With competition intensifying between the US and China, the Americans are looking to offset Chinese influence - not just by political means, but also by mimicking China’s economic outreach through investments and infrastructure projects.

At the same time, the US appears increasingly skeptical of the EU, seeing it as an expensive commitment that yields little strategic return. Thus, Washington now aims to control cargo flows not only destined for China but also for the EU. In that sense, securing influence over the Caucasus - what I call the region’s “throat” - is essential.

Q: With Armenia and Azerbaijan distancing themselves from Moscow, is the Kremlin losing its grip in the South Caucasus? Could Georgia become its fallback?

Areshidze: If Russia wanted to make Georgia a balancing pillar in the region, it would need to take tangible steps - like restoring our territorial integrity. But Moscow isn’t doing that. There were some faint signals in 2024, especially discussions in Abkhaz social media circles about a potential confederative arrangement, but that’s all quiet now.

It seems the hardliners in the Kremlin - those opposed to returning Abkhazia and Tskhinvali - are prevailing. I see no serious Russian moves in Georgia's direction.

Q: The MEGOBARI Act has stalled in the US Senate despite bipartisan support. What could explain this delay, and what does it mean for US–Georgia relations?

Areshidze: It’s not just a procedural delay - it reflects deeper divisions between the Biden administration and elements within Congress. While the United National Movement has long employed professional lobbyists in Washington, the Georgian Dream government has taken a different route, using informal influence networks closer to the executive branch.

This approach has swayed certain key US policymakers to argue that Georgia does not currently warrant sanctions. I wouldn’t be surprised if the Trump camp is also playing a behind-the-scenes role here.

Q: The European Union has hinted at suspending Georgia’s visa-free regime if key conditions aren’t met by the end of August. Some observers dismiss this as "tough talk." How serious is the threat, in your view?

Areshidze: Interestingly, the strongest proponents of EU sanctions on Georgia are the Baltic states. But the internal EU debate remains sharply divided - between conservatives and liberals. One argument that’s gaining traction is that if Brussels suspends visa-free travel, it could backfire by fuelling anti-EU sentiment in Georgia.

The idea that Georgia is "turning toward Russia" has become a tired narrative. Without resolving our territorial disputes, no Georgian government - neither Georgian Dream nor any successor - can pivot to Moscow. The Georgian public would never accept that. The visa issue is being weaponized in a domestic political struggle in Europe, but its unintended consequence might be alienating Georgians from the EU altogether.

By Elza Paposhvili